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f7fee24f76
openwrt-xburst/package/tcp_wrappers/patches/debian-subset.patch
nbd 1ddd3743de add libwrap, portmap, nfs-server 
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk/openwrt@450 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
2005-03-24 23:17:53 +00:00

937 lines
32 KiB
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--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/hosts_access.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/hosts_access.c
@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@
}
}
+/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
+
+static int hostfile_match(path, host)
+char *path;
+struct hosts_info *host;
+{
+ char tok[BUFSIZ];
+ int match = NO;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
+ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
+ /* void */ ;
+ fclose(fp);
+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
+ }
+ return (match);
+}
+
/* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
static int host_match(tok, host)
@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@
tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */
return (NO);
#endif
+ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */
+ return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
} else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */
char *name = eval_hostname(host);
return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/tcpd.h
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpd.h
@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
* Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
*/
+#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
+#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
+
+/* someone else may have defined this */
+#undef __P
+
+/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */
+#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus)
+#define __P(args) args
+#else
+#define __P(args) ()
+#endif
+
+/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+__BEGIN_DECLS
+
/* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
#define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */
@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@
char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */
struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */
struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */
- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */
- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */
- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */
+ void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
+ void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */
+ void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */
+ void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */
struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */
};
@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@
/* Global functions. */
#if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
-extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */
+extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */
#else
#define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */
#endif
-extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */
-extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */
-extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */
-extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
-extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */
-extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */
-extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */
-extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */
-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */
+extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */
+extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */
+extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
+extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
+extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
+extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */
+extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */
+extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */
/* Global variables. */
+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
+extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
+extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
+#else
extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */
extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */
+#endif
+
extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */
@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@
*/
#ifdef __STDC__
+extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request);
+extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr,
+ char *client_user);
extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...);
extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...);
#else
+extern int hosts_access();
+extern int hosts_ctl();
extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */
extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */
#endif
@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@
* host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
*/
-extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */
-extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */
-extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */
-extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */
-extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */
-extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */
+extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */
+extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */
+extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */
+extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */
+extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
+extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */
#define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */
#define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */
/* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
-extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */
-extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */
-extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */
+/* look up endpoint addresses */
+extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *));
+/* translate address to hostname */
+extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *));
+/* address to printable address */
+extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));
+
#define sock_methods(r) \
{ (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
/* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */
#if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
-extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
+extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
#endif
/*
@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@
* behavior.
*/
-extern void process_options(); /* execute options */
+extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */
extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */
/* Bug workarounds. */
@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@
#define strtok my_strtok
extern char *my_strtok();
#endif
+
+__END_DECLS
+
+#endif /* tcpd.h */
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/Makefile
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
+GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h)
+
# @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20
+# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable
+HOSTNAME =
+
what:
@echo
@echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:"
@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@
@echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)"
@echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543"
@echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix"
- @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
+ @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
@echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4"
@echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2"
@echo " uts215 uxp"
@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@
# Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx
#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc
#
-# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX
-#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
+# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux
+REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
#
# BSD 4.4
#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec
@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@
LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \
EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all
+ifneq ($(GLIBC),0)
+MYLIB=-lnsl
+endif
+
linux:
@make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \
- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all
+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
+
+gnu:
+ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
+ LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
+ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
+ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
# This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x.
hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10:
@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@
# the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module
# implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv().
-AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
+#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
#AUX_OBJ= environ.o
#AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o
@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@
# host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work
# around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions.
-BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
+BUGS =
+#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG
#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG
@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@
# If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following
# macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control.
#
-#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
+NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
###############################################################
# System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog()
@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@
# Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions
# (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn).
#
-#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
+STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions.
################################################################
# Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records
@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@
#
# The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file.
-FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
+FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
# The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged.
@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@
# Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname
# lookups altogether, see the next section.
-PARANOID= -DPARANOID
+#PARANOID= -DPARANOID
########################################
# Optional: turning off hostname lookups
@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@
# In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid
# mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition.
-HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
+#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
#############################################
# Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking
@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@
# source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives,
# Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details.
#
-# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
+KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
## End configuration options
############################
# Protection against weird shells or weird make programs.
+CC = gcc
SHELL = /bin/sh
-.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
+.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c
+
+SOMAJOR = 0
+SOMINOR = 7.6
+
+LIB = libwrap.a
+SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR)
+SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR)
+SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so
+SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap
-CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
+shared/%.o: %.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+CFLAGS = -O2 -g -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
$(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \
-DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \
-DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \
$(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \
$(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME)
+SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS)
+SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT
+
LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \
hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \
$(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \
update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o
+SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ));
+
FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o
KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \
@@ -684,46 +719,78 @@
refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \
scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS
-LIB = libwrap.a
-
-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk
+all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB)
# Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed.
config-check:
@set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; }
- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \
+ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \
+ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \
+ then rm cflags.new ; \
+ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \
fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi
$(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ)
rm -f $(LIB)
$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ)
-$(RANLIB) $(LIB)
-tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ)
+ rm -f $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ)
+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ)
+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO)
+
+tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-miscd: miscd.o $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
+tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
+
+install-lib:
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/lib/
+ ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
+
+install-bin:
+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
+
+install-dev:
+ ln -s /lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
+ install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
+ ln -s hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
shar: $(KIT)
@shar $(KIT)
@@ -739,7 +806,8 @@
clean:
rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \
- cflags
+ cflags libwrap*.so*
+ rm -rf shared
tidy: clean
chmod -R a+r .
@@ -885,5 +953,6 @@
update.o: mystdarg.h
update.o: tcpd.h
vfprintf.o: cflags
+weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h
workarounds.o: cflags
workarounds.o: tcpd.h
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/hosts_access.5
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/hosts_access.5
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
quick introduction.
.PP
-An extended version of the access control language is described in the
-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
+The extended version of the access control language is described in the
+\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
+the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
.PP
In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
easier to edit.
.IP \(bu
-Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
+Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
are easier to read.
.IP \(bu
@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@
.SH PATTERNS
The access control language implements the following patterns:
.IP \(bu
-A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
+A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For
-example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
-`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
+example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
+`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
.IP \(bu
-A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
+A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the
-pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
+pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
.IP \(bu
-A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
+A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
(formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
for daemon process names or for client user names.
.IP \(bu
-An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
-bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
-pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
-range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
+An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
+`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
+bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
+pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
+range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
+.IP \(bu
+A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
+name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
+or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
+zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
+separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere
+a host name or address pattern can be used.
.SH WILDCARDS
The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
.IP ALL
@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@
.ne 6
.SH OPERATORS
.IP EXCEPT
-Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
+Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
\fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
-language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
-would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
+language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
+would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
.br
.ne 6
.SH SHELL COMMANDS
If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
-input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\'
+input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&'
at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
completed.
.PP
@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@
.IP %u
The client user name (or "unknown").
.IP %%
-Expands to a single `%\' character.
+Expands to a single `%' character.
.PP
Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
underscores.
@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@
less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
-the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
+the client's IDENT server is lying.
.PP
-Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
+Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
.SH EXAMPLES
The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@
.br
ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
.PP
-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
+The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
\fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@
/etc/hosts.deny:
.in +3
.nf
-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
+in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
+ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
.fi
.PP
The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@
capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
-that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
+that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
.SH FILES
.na
.nf
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/rfc931.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/rfc931.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */
-static jmp_buf timebuf;
+static sigjmp_buf timebuf;
/* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
static void timeout(sig)
int sig;
{
- longjmp(timebuf, sig);
+ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig);
}
/* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
* Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
*/
- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) {
+ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) {
signal(SIGALRM, timeout);
alarm(rfc931_timeout);
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/tcpd.8
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpd.8
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
.PP
The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
-no `in.\' prefix to their name.
+no `in.' prefix to their name.
.SH EXAMPLE 2
This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
are left in their original place.
@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@
becomes:
.sp
.ti +5
-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd
+finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd
.sp
.fi
.PP
The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
-daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
+daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
field in the inetd configuration file.
.PP
Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
-covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
+covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
-execute the `inetimp\' command.
+execute the `inetimp' command.
.SH EXAMPLE 3
In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
.nf
.sp
- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
+ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd
.sp
.fi
.PP
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/hosts_access.3
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/hosts_access.3
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library
.SH SYNOPSIS
.nf
-#include "tcpd.h"
+#include <tcpd.h>
extern int allow_severity;
extern int deny_severity;
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/options.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/options.c
@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@
#ifdef LOG_CRON
"cron", LOG_CRON,
#endif
+#ifdef LOG_FTP
+ "ftp", LOG_FTP,
+#endif
#ifdef LOG_LOCAL0
"local0", LOG_LOCAL0,
#endif
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/fix_options.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/fix_options.c
@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp;
char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp;
+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto;
+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
+ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf);
+ int ipproto;
+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
struct protoent *ip;
int fd = request->fd;
unsigned int opt;
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/workarounds.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/workarounds.c
@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@
int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len)
int sock;
struct sockaddr *sa;
+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
int *len;
+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
+size_t *len;
+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
{
int ret;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/socket.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/socket.c
@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@
{
static struct sockaddr_in client;
static struct sockaddr_in server;
+#if !defined (__GLIBC__)
int len;
+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
+ size_t len;
+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
char buf[BUFSIZ];
int fd = request->fd;
@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@
{
char buf[BUFSIZ];
struct sockaddr_in sin;
+#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
int size = sizeof(sin);
+#else /* __GLIBC__ */
+ size_t size = sizeof(sin);
+#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
/*
* Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/safe_finger.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger.c
@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
extern void exit();
/* Local stuff */
-char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin";
+char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin";
#define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
#define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */
#define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */
#define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */
#define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */
-#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */
+#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */
int finger_pid;
+int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
void cleanup(sig)
int sig;
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/hosts_options.5
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/hosts_options.5
@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@
Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
+connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the
conversation with the client host. Example:
.sp
.nf
.ti +3
-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) &
+spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) &
.fi
.sp
executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpdchk.c
@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@
{
if (pat[0] == '@') {
tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat);
+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
+ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat);
} else if (pat[0] == '.') {
tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat);
} else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@
{
if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat);
+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
+ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat);
} else if (pat[0] == '.') {
tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat);
} else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@
static int check_host(pat)
char *pat;
{
+ char buf[BUFSIZ];
char *mask;
int addr_count = 1;
+ FILE *fp;
+ struct tcpd_context saved_context;
+ char *cp;
+ char *wsp = " \t\r\n";
if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */
#ifdef NO_NETGRENT
@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@
tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled");
#endif
#endif
+ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */
+ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) {
+ saved_context = tcpd_context;
+ tcpd_context.file = pat;
+ tcpd_context.line = 0;
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
+ tcpd_context.line++;
+ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp))
+ check_host(cp);
+ }
+ tcpd_context = saved_context;
+ fclose(fp);
+ } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat);
+ }
} else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */
if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE
|| dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE)
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/percent_m.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/percent_m.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include <string.h>
extern int errno;
-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
+#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR)
extern char *sys_errlist[];
extern int sys_nerr;
#endif
@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@
while (*bp = *cp)
if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
+#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR
+ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno));
+#else
if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]);
} else {
sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno);
}
+#endif
bp += strlen(bp);
cp += 2;
} else {
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/scaffold.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/scaffold.c
@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@
/* ARGSUSED */
-void rfc931(request)
-struct request_info *request;
+void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
+struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin;
+struct sockaddr_in *our_sin;
+char *dest;
{
- strcpy(request->user, unknown);
+ strcpy(dest, unknown);
}
/* check_path - examine accessibility */
--- tcp-wrappers-7.6.orig/weak_symbols.c
+++ tcp-wrappers-7.6/weak_symbols.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+ /*
+ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50
+ *
+ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org>
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
+#include <syslog.h>
+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
+int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
+#endif
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