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# DWT / rdebug investigation — cross-agent notes
Two agents run in parallel:
| agent | owns | file |
|---|---|---|
| static (Ghidra) | `rdebug_*` functions, command dispatcher, gates | `dwt/notes/rdebug-static.md` |
| protocol (MOP) | MOP Remote Console framing + `dwt/mop_console.py` | `dwt/notes/mop-protocol.md` |
**Append only, with a timestamp header.** Facts that change the other agent's
next step go here; speculation stays in your own file. Do not rewrite another
agent's section.
---
## 2026-10-18 01:48 EEST — protocol agent: framing is known, client exists
Facts (sources in `dwt/notes/mop-protocol.md`):
* Ethernet II, **ethertype 0x6002** = MOP Remote Console (0x6001 = Dump/Load).
Destination = terminal unicast MAC `08:00:2b:16:4b:5a` (verified; multicast
`ab:00:00:02:00:00` also defined by the spec).
* MOP payload: `len_lo len_hi | code | body…`, length is **little-endian and
counts the bytes after the length field** (code + body). Pad the payload to the
**46-byte Ethernet minimum**; the length field, not the frame size, delimits.
* Codes we need: **13** Reserve Console (body = 8-byte verification), **5**
Request ID (body = `00` + 2-byte receipt), **7** System ID (reply), **17**
Console Command and Poll (body = flags + console bytes), **19** Console
Response and Acknowledge (reply; body = flags + console bytes), **15**
Release Console.
* Session: send 13 then 5; wait for 7. Function bitmap in System ID info TLV
type 2, **bit 5 = console carrier** (0x20). Data is **not** framed with a
session id or sequence beyond CCP flag bit 0 (1-bit message number, toggles
per command); bit 1 = send break. Flag bit 0 of CRA acknowledges the command.
* No checksum in Remote Console (unlike Dump/Load), no version byte on the wire.
* Password: the 8-byte Reserve-Console verification is the MOP service
password, default `00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`. Wrong value = terminal silently
ignores the request (documented NCP behaviour: "Target does not respond").
NCL byte order = leftmost hex pair first; NCP integer order = reversed.
VT1200 has no documented maintenance password, so start with zeros.
* Console data is a raw byte stream. To type a command send `HELP\r`; the
terminal echoes `DWT>>> ` and CRLF text. Use `--raw HEX` for arbitrary bytes.
Client: `dwt/mop_console.py`. `--dry-run` prints frames without a socket;
`--raw HEX` sends bytes inside CCP; `--raw-frame HEX` sends a complete MOP
payload if a bare rdebug opcode ever has to bypass the console stream.
## 2026-10-18 — static agent: rdebug is a *separate TCP service*, and MAME has no netdev
Facts that change the transport assumption (details + quotes in
`dwt/notes/rdebug-static.md`):
1. **The `rdebug_*` family is not reached over MOP.** It is a TCP listener
registered in the terminal's service table as **`"DEBUG TCP Port"`**, port
field `0x0303` (network order = **771**). The sibling entry in the same
table is port `0x1770` = 6000 = X11, which is what fixes the field layout.
Accept handler `0x07EB15AC` (bit `0x3F58AD60`); it spawns a process named
`"remote debug"` whose entry is the dispatcher `0x07EB3E64`
(bit `0x3F59F320`).
2. **Wire format is binary, not text.** Request = `u32 be opcode` + opcode
arguments (each word big-endian). Response framing =
`u32 be (payload_len+1)` + `u8 flag` + payload. Opcode 7 is a no-op that
answers 11 bytes: `00 00 00 07 | 00 | 44 6F 6E 65 0A 00` (len field = 7 =
payload 6 + flag 1; payload is `"Done\n"` **plus its NUL**, because the
handler passes the 6-byte C string at `0x07EB6CE9`). The cheapest liveness
test.
3. **There is a gate before any command**: `accept_debug_conn` reads a 16-bit
config word at **bit address `0xAECD2`** and rejects the connection when it
is non-zero (logs `Debug connection from IP host %s` then ` rejected`).
On the emulated machine (`VT1200_SKIP_LEVEL1=1`, fresh NVRAM) it reads
**`0x8070`** at frames 200/600/1200/2000/3000/4000, i.e. **closed**. Setting
`space:write_u16(0xAECD2, 0)` from a debugger script opens it.
4. **A second gate follows**: before the first opcode >= 2 the dispatcher runs a
16-byte request/response exchange (`dwt_prf`, `0x07EB3FB8`). It sends 16
bytes with message flag `0x7F` and requires exactly 16 bytes back (short
read => `dwt_prf: challenge failed - size error`), then returns 1/0 and the
session is killed on 0. What passes is **not established**; it is not a
password (no ROM/NVRAM constant is compared). Echoing the 16 bytes back is
the first thing to try.
5. **MAME cannot accept the connection today.** `harness/mame/vt1200.cpp` binds
the AM79C90 with no `netdev`, so the firmware's TCP/IP stack has no link.
A "MOP console client" run against MAME will not reach any socket unless a
host network is attached or the debugger drives
`accept_debug_conn`/the dispatcher directly.
6. The **documented console** (`INIT`/`TEST`/`HELP`/`SHOW`) is a *different*
path: a 4-entry text-command table at RAM bit `0xA5C20` (byte `0x14B84`),
parsed by `0x07E59186(char*, int)` from the console character ring at bit
`0xF4D10`. There are exactly four names; no undocumented fifth entry.
## 2026-10-18 02:05 EEST — protocol agent: MOP console WORKS against the emulator
Runtime facts, `VT1200_SKIP_LEVEL1=1`, `-cfg_directory cfg-net -networkprovider
taptun`, private NVRAM. Capture `dwt/evidence/mop-hello.pcap`, log
`dwt/evidence/hello.log`.
* `Reserve Console` (13, verification = 8 zero bytes) + `Request ID` (5) gets a
**System ID (7)** in ~0.5 ms. Decode of the VT1200 reply:
maintenance 3.0.0; functions `0xE1` (loop, console carrier, counters,
reservation); console user = host MAC; timer 12 s; command buffer 32 B;
response buffer 600 B; hardware address `08:00:2b:16:4b:5a`.
* `HELP` (sent as `HELP\r` in a CCP, code 17) returns **425 bytes** in one
CRA (code 19, length 427, frame 443). `SHOW` returns **509 bytes** (frame
527). Full text in `dwt/evidence/dwt-help.txt` and
`dwt/evidence/dwt-show.txt`.
* **No challenge/password on this path.** Reserve with zeros works; Reserve
with the arbitrary non-zero value `0102030405060708` also works
(`dwt/evidence/wrong-password.log`). The `dwt_prf` challenge is the **TCP
debug listener** per `rdebug-static.md` §6, not MOP.
* **DWT is OS-only.** Bare boot (no skip) holds `PC=3FDCE400` from frame 100 to
3600 (`dwt/evidence/mame-noos-probe.log`) and 8 Reserve/RequestID pairs over
8 s get **zero** frames back (`noos-attempt3.log`, `mop-noos.pcap`).
* `TEST 0 0` and `TEST 12` are accepted and print `…Testing...`, then the MOP
server stops answering: a following Reserve gets no System ID on two fresh
boots (`script3.log`, `test00b.log`, `test12.log`, `help-after-test*.log`).
This matches the service guide's precondition "no active work (no open
windows)"; we could not meet it because DWT lives in the running session
manager.
* `INIT` gets **no reply** and the terminal stops answering MOP for >90 s
(`init.log`, `help-after-init2.log`) — consistent with a reset/reboot.
**Important for the rdebug work:** the MOP console is the *text* path into the
four-entry DWT parser (`TEST/INIT/HELP/SHOW`, `rdebug-static.md` §9). It is
**not** the rdebug binary-opcode path. `--raw HEX` sends bytes into that text
parser, so it cannot reach `rdebug_peek`/`poke`/`jump`; those are TCP port 771
and gated (`rdebug-static.md` §1/§7). Use this client for the documented
console, not as an rdebug transport.
## 2026-10-18 02:07 EEST — exploit agent: gate A is OPEN; the 0x8070 reading was a field-size mistake
**This changes the static note's verdict.** `accept_debug_conn` does **not** read a
16-bit word. The listing is:
```
3f58b280: setf 2, 0, 0 ; field size = 2 BITS (MAME prints 1..0x20 = size)
3f58b290: move @0xaecd2, a7, 0 ; read the 2-bit field at bit 0xAECD2
3f58b2c0: jreq L3F58B430 ; zero -> ACCEPT path
```
`SETF`'s first operand is the field size in bits (`34010dsm.cpp` prints
`(op & 0x1f) ? op & 0x1f : 0x20`); `setf 2` = 2 bits. The compared value is
therefore **bits 2..3 of the word at 0xAECD0**, not the whole word. The word is
`0x8070` from frame ~600 onward (and `0x0000` before), and in both cases
bits 2..3 are **0**.
Verified on the emulated CPU: jumping the live firmware into `0x3F58B280` with a
breakpoint on both targets hits **`3F58B430` (ACCEPT)** with `a7=0`; the reject
target is never reached. Evidence: `dwt/evidence/run-branch/`.
The two 2-bit fields in that word are written by `3F329F00` (@0xAECD0) and
`3F32A050` (@0xAECD2) from config lookups; those stores did **not** execute in
the `VT1200_SKIP_LEVEL1=1` boot. The `0x8070` itself arrives via the PIXBLT
memcpy at PC `3FB446D0` (a boot-time settings/bitmap block copy), which is why a
watchpoint saw it. Do not use the whole-word value as a gate indicator.
**Consequence for the MOP agent:** the rdebug path is not blocked by the config
word on this image; the remaining gate is the 16-byte echo challenge (`dwt_prf`),
which the static reading now also resolves in favour of echo (the transform
writes to `@0x1C0240`, not to the reply buffer, and the memcmp is
`reply` vs `sent`). Do not patch `0xAECD2` to "open" the port; it is already 0
in the field that matters.
**Tap:** no vt1200 MAME instance or tcpdump is running as of 02:07. I am about
to use `tap-mess-1000-0` / bridge `vt1200` for a short live TCP test. If you
start a MAME instance, please leave the tap alone for a few minutes or note it
here.
## 2026-10-18 02:40 EEST — exploit agent: gate B is real; args must follow the challenge
Live result against the emulated terminal (`VT1200_SKIP_LEVEL1=1`, LANCE on the
tap, BOOTP address 192.168.99.2):
* **Gate A is not a gate.** A TCP connection to 771 reached
`accept_debug_conn`, the dispatcher and `dwt_prf` (breakpoints fired). The
`0xAECD2` compare is a 2-bit field read by `SETF 2`; it is 0. Do not patch
the 16-bit word at `0xAECD0`.
* **Gate B is real.** `dwt_prf` sends 16 bytes (flag 0x7F) and requires exactly
16 back. Echo gives `memcmp = 0xFFFFFFFF` and the session is killed. The
expected value is the wire challenge with each **32-bit word byte-swapped**
(the code ntohl's the host words into the send buffer and memcmp's the
host-order copy), but even that ("computed") gives `memcmp = 0x00000001`:
the received buffer is first rewritten in place by a fixed-key font/cipher
pipeline (`0x3F5A09C0` → two 8-byte records → `0x3F5ABA40`, tables at
`@0x1C0220`/`@0x1C0240`, cipher `0x3F5ACEC0`). Not inverted here.
* **Opcode ≥ 2 all require the challenge, including 7.** Only 0 and 1 skip it,
and neither reaches poke/jump.
* **Protocol ordering matters:** send the opcode alone, read and answer the
challenge, *then* send the handler's arguments. If the args go with the
opcode, `dwt_prf` eats their first 16 bytes as the answer and the handler
reads shifted fields (a peek length of 8 was reported as "maximum peek size").
* With the challenge comparison forced to 0 **by a debugger breakpoint** (not
remotely), the real `poke`/`jump` handlers delivered and ran
`harness/hello-world/payload.bin`: `MAGIC1=DEAD MAGIC2=BEEF COUNT=0400`,
VRAM 1024/1024. That is the debugger-assisted loader proof, not a remote
bypass. Poke/peek addresses are bit addresses; ROM writes are ignored.
The tap (`tap-mess-1000-0` / bridge `vt1200`) is free again as of 02:40; the
MAME instance and the BOOTP server are stopped. Full write-up:
`dwt/notes/EXPLOIT_ATTEMPT.md`; transcript and logs under `dwt/evidence/`.