mirror of
https://github.com/Neo-Desktop/WindowsXPKg
synced 2024-10-01 05:01:06 +03:00
367 lines
12 KiB
C++
367 lines
12 KiB
C++
//
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// Created by Andrew on 01/06/2023.
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//
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#include "header.h"
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char pCharset[] = "BCDFGHJKMPQRTVWXY2346789";
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const std::string filename = "keys.json";
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using json = nlohmann::json;
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/* Unpacks the Windows XP-like Product Key. */
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void unpackServer(
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QWORD (&pRaw)[2],
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DWORD &pChannelID,
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DWORD &pHash,
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QWORD &pSignature,
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DWORD &pAuthInfo
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) {
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// We're assuming that the quantity of information within the product key is at most 114 bits.
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// log2(24^25) = 114.
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// Channel ID = Bits [0..10] -> 11 bits
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pChannelID = FIRSTNBITS(pRaw[0], 11);
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// Hash = Bits [11..41] -> 31 bits
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pHash = NEXTSNBITS(pRaw[0], 31, 11);
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// Signature = Bits [42..103] -> 62 bits
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// The quad-word signature overlaps AuthInfo in bits 104 and 105,
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// hence Microsoft employs a secret technique called: Signature = HIDWORD(Signature) >> 2 | LODWORD(Signature)
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pSignature = NEXTSNBITS(pRaw[1], 30, 10) << 32 | FIRSTNBITS(pRaw[1], 10) << 22 | NEXTSNBITS(pRaw[0], 22, 42);
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// AuthInfo = Bits [104..113] -> 10 bits
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pAuthInfo = NEXTSNBITS(pRaw[1], 10, 40);
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}
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void packServer(
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QWORD (&pRaw)[2],
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DWORD pChannelID,
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DWORD pHash,
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QWORD &pSignature,
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DWORD pAuthInfo
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) {
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// AuthInfo [113..104] <- Signature [103..42] <- Hash [41..11] <- Channel ID [10..1] <- Upgrade [0]
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pRaw[0] = FIRSTNBITS(pSignature, 22) << 42 | (QWORD)pHash << 11 | pChannelID;
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pRaw[1] = FIRSTNBITS(pAuthInfo, 10) << 40 | NEXTSNBITS(pSignature, 40, 22);
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}
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bool verifyServerKey(
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EC_GROUP *eCurve,
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EC_POINT *basePoint,
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EC_POINT *publicKey,
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char (&cdKey)[25]
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) {
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BN_CTX *context = BN_CTX_new();
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// Convert Base24 CD-key to bytecode.
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DWORD pChannelID, pHash, pAuthInfo;
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QWORD bKey[2]{};
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QWORD pSignature = 0;
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unbase24((BYTE *)bKey, cdKey);
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// Extract segments from the bytecode and reverse the signature.
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unpackServer(bKey, pChannelID, pHash, pSignature, pAuthInfo);
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std::cout << "Validation results:\n Serial: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pChannelID << std::endl
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<< " Hash: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pHash << std::endl
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<< " Signature: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pSignature << std::endl
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<< " AuthInfo: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pAuthInfo << std::endl
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<< std::endl;
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BYTE msgDigest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]{},
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msgBuffer[SHA_MSG_LENGTH_2003]{},
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xBin[FIELD_BYTES_2003]{},
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yBin[FIELD_BYTES_2003]{};
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// H = SHA-1(5D || OS Family || Hash || Prefix || 00 00)
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msgBuffer[0x00] = 0x5D;
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msgBuffer[0x01] = (pChannelID & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x02] = (pChannelID & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x03] = (pHash & 0x000000FF);
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msgBuffer[0x04] = (pHash & 0x0000FF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x05] = (pHash & 0x00FF0000) >> 16;
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msgBuffer[0x06] = (pHash & 0xFF000000) >> 24;
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msgBuffer[0x07] = (pAuthInfo & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x08] = (pAuthInfo & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x09] = 0x00;
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msgBuffer[0x0A] = 0x00;
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SHA1(msgBuffer, 11, msgDigest);
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QWORD newHash = NEXTSNBITS(BYDWORD(&msgDigest[4]), 30, 2) << 32 | BYDWORD(msgDigest);
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BIGNUM *x = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *y = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *s = BN_lebin2bn((BYTE *)&pSignature, sizeof(pSignature), nullptr);
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BIGNUM *e = BN_lebin2bn((BYTE *)&newHash, sizeof(newHash), nullptr);
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EC_POINT *u = EC_POINT_new(eCurve);
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EC_POINT *v = EC_POINT_new(eCurve);
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// EC_POINT_mul calculates r = basePoint * n + q * m.
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// v = s * (s * basePoint + e * publicKey)
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// u = basePoint * s
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EC_POINT_mul(eCurve, u, nullptr, basePoint, s, context);
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// v = publicKey * e
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EC_POINT_mul(eCurve, v, nullptr, publicKey, e, context);
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// v += u
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EC_POINT_add(eCurve, v, u, v, context);
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// v *= s
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EC_POINT_mul(eCurve, v, nullptr, v, s, context);
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// EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates() sets x and y, either of which may be nullptr, to the corresponding coordinates of p.
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// x = v.x; y = v.y;
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EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(eCurve, v, x, y, context);
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// Convert resulting point coordinates to bytes.
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BN_bn2lebin(x, xBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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BN_bn2lebin(y, yBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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// Assemble the SHA message.
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msgBuffer[0x00] = 0x79;
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msgBuffer[0x01] = (pChannelID & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x02] = (pChannelID & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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memcpy((void *)&msgBuffer[3], (void *)xBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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memcpy((void *)&msgBuffer[3 + FIELD_BYTES_2003], (void *)yBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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// Retrieve the message digest.
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SHA1(msgBuffer, SHA_MSG_LENGTH_2003, msgDigest);
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// Translate the byte digest into a 32-bit integer - this is our computed pHash.
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// Truncate the pHash to 28 bits.
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// Hash = First31(SHA-1(79 || OS Family || v.x || v.y))
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DWORD compHash = BYDWORD(msgDigest) & BITMASK(31);
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BN_free(s);
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BN_free(e);
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BN_free(x);
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BN_free(y);
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BN_CTX_free(context);
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EC_POINT_free(v);
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EC_POINT_free(u);
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// If we managed to generate a key with the same pHash, the key is correct.
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return compHash == pHash;
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}
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void generateServerKey(
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EC_GROUP *eCurve,
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EC_POINT *basePoint,
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BIGNUM *genOrder,
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BIGNUM *privateKey,
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DWORD pChannelID,
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DWORD pAuthInfo,
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char (&pKey)[25]
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) {
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BN_CTX *numContext = BN_CTX_new();
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BIGNUM *c = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *s = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *x = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *y = BN_new();
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BIGNUM *e = BN_new();
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QWORD pRaw[2]{};
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BOOL wrong = false;
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QWORD pSignature = 0;
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do {
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EC_POINT *r = EC_POINT_new(eCurve);
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wrong = false;
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QWORD sig = 0;
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// Generate a random number c consisting of 512 bits without any constraints.
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BN_rand(c, FIELD_BITS_2003, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY);
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// r = basePoint * c
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EC_POINT_mul(eCurve, r, nullptr, basePoint, c, numContext);
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// x = r.x; y = r.y;
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EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(eCurve, r, x, y, numContext);
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BYTE msgDigest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]{},
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msgBuffer[SHA_MSG_LENGTH_2003]{},
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xBin[FIELD_BYTES_2003]{},
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yBin[FIELD_BYTES_2003]{};
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// Convert resulting point coordinates to bytes.
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BN_bn2lebin(x, xBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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BN_bn2lebin(y, yBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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// Assemble the SHA message.
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// Hash = SHA-1(79 || OS Family || r.x || r.y)
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msgBuffer[0x00] = 0x79;
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msgBuffer[0x01] = (pChannelID & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x02] = (pChannelID & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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memcpy((void *)&msgBuffer[3], (void *)xBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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memcpy((void *)&msgBuffer[3 + FIELD_BYTES_2003], (void *)yBin, FIELD_BYTES_2003);
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// Retrieve the message digest.
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SHA1(msgBuffer, SHA_MSG_LENGTH_2003, msgDigest);
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DWORD hash = BYDWORD(msgDigest) & BITMASK(31);
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// H = SHA-1(5D || OS Family || Hash || Prefix || 00 00)
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msgBuffer[0x00] = 0x5D;
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msgBuffer[0x01] = (pChannelID & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x02] = (pChannelID & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x03] = (hash & 0x000000FF);
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msgBuffer[0x04] = (hash & 0x0000FF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x05] = (hash & 0x00FF0000) >> 16;
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msgBuffer[0x06] = (hash & 0xFF000000) >> 24;
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msgBuffer[0x07] = (pAuthInfo & 0x00FF);
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msgBuffer[0x08] = (pAuthInfo & 0xFF00) >> 8;
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msgBuffer[0x09] = 0x00;
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msgBuffer[0x0A] = 0x00;
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SHA1(msgBuffer, 11, msgDigest);
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// First word.
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sig = NEXTSNBITS(BYDWORD(&msgDigest[4]), 30, 2) << 32 | BYDWORD(msgDigest);
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BN_lebin2bn((BYTE *)&sig, sizeof(sig), e);
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/*
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* Signature * (Signature * G + H * K) = rG (mod p)
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* ↓ K = kG ↓
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*
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* Signature * (Signature * G + H * k * G) = rG (mod p)
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* Signature^2 * G + Signature * HkG = rG (mod p)
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* G(Signature^2 + Signature * HkG) = G (mod p) * r
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* ↓ G^(-1)(G (mod p)) = (mod n), n = genOrder of G ↓
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*
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* Signature^2 + Hk * Signature = r (mod n)
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* Signature = -(e +- sqrt(D)) / 2a → Signature = (-Hk +- sqrt((Hk)^2 + 4r)) / 2
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*
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* S = (-Hk +- sqrt((Hk)^2 + 4r)) (mod n) / 2
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*
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* S = s
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* H = e
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* k = privateKey
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* n = genOrder
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* r = c
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*
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* s = ( ( -e * privateKey +- sqrt( (e * privateKey)^2 + 4c ) ) / 2 ) % genOrder
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*/
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// e = (e * privateKey) % genOrder
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BN_mod_mul(e, e, privateKey, genOrder, numContext);
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// s = e
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BN_copy(s, e);
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// s = (s % genOrder)^2
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BN_mod_sqr(s, s, genOrder, numContext);
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// c <<= 2 (c = 4c)
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BN_lshift(c, c, 2);
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// s = s + c
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BN_add(s, s, c);
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// s^2 = s % genOrder (genOrder must be prime)
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if (BN_mod_sqrt(s, s, genOrder, numContext) == nullptr) wrong = true;
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// s = s - e
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BN_mod_sub(s, s, e, genOrder, numContext);
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// if s is odd, s = s + genOrder
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if (BN_is_odd(s)) {
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BN_add(s, s, genOrder);
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}
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// s >>= 1 (s = s / 2)
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BN_rshift1(s, s);
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// Convert s from BigNum back to bytecode and reverse the endianness.
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BN_bn2lebinpad(s, (BYTE *)&pSignature, BN_num_bytes(s));
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// Pack product key.
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packServer(pRaw, pChannelID, hash, pSignature, pAuthInfo);
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std::cout << "Generation results:\n Serial: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pChannelID << std::endl
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<< " Hash: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << hash << std::endl
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<< " Signature: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pSignature << std::endl
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<< " AuthInfo: 0x" << std::hex << std::setw(8) << std::setfill('0') << pAuthInfo << std::endl
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<< std::endl;
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EC_POINT_free(r);
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} while (HIBYTES(pSignature, sizeof(DWORD)) >= 0x40000000);
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base24(pKey, (BYTE *)pRaw);
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std::cout << "attempt pass " << pKey << " key is " << (wrong ? "INVALID" : "VALID") << std::endl;
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BN_free(c);
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BN_free(s);
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BN_free(x);
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BN_free(y);
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BN_free(e);
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BN_CTX_free(numContext);
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}
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int main()
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{
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const char* BINKID = "5A";
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// We cannot produce a valid key without knowing the private key k. The reason for this is that
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// we need the result of the function K(x; y) = kG(x; y).
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BIGNUM *privateKey = BN_new();
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// We can, however, validate any given key using the available public key: {p, a, b, G, K}.
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// genOrder the order of the generator G, a value we have to reverse -> Schoof's Algorithm.
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BIGNUM *genOrder = BN_new();
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std::ifstream f(filename);
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json keys = json::parse(f);
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EC_POINT *genPoint, *pubPoint;
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EC_GROUP *eCurve = initializeEllipticCurve(
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["p"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["a"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["b"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["g"]["x"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["g"]["y"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["pub"]["x"].get<std::string>(),
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keys["BINK"][BINKID]["pub"]["y"].get<std::string>(),
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genPoint,
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pubPoint
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);
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BN_dec2bn(&genOrder, keys["BINK"][BINKID]["n"].get<std::string>().c_str());
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BN_dec2bn(&privateKey, keys["BINK"][BINKID]["priv"].get<std::string>().c_str());
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char pKey[25]{};
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DWORD pChannelID = 640 << 1, pAuthInfo;
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RAND_bytes((BYTE *)&pAuthInfo, 4);
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pAuthInfo &= 0x3ff;
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printf("AuthInfo: %d\n", pAuthInfo);
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do {
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generateServerKey(eCurve, genPoint, genOrder, privateKey, pChannelID, pAuthInfo, pKey);
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} while (!verifyServerKey(eCurve, genPoint, pubPoint, pKey));
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print_product_key(pKey);
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std::cout << std::endl << std::endl;
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return 0;
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}
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